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ABSTRACT

Riparian Zone Protection: The Use of the Willingness-toAccept Format in a Contingent Valuation Study

by

Catherine A. Broadhead, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2000

Major Professor: Basudeb Biswas
Department: Economics

The contingent valuation method (CVM) is used to evaluate the minimum
compensation landowners require to forego production on farm riverbank areas . The
elic itation format used in the survey is a yes-no panicipation question followed by an
open-ended question.
Chapter 2 presents the results of the survey. The Heckman approach is used in the
econometric analysis to take care of the self-select ion problem arising with this
fo rmatting of the questions. Chapter 3 is devoted to further examining the potential for
undertaking valuation exercises using the willingness-to-accept format {WT A)
WTA estimates obtained with open-ended format are compared to WT A estimates
obtained when respondents are placed in a "contingent first-price sealed-bid auction"
setting. Results indicate that WT A values obtained in the two different settings were
not statistically different. More generally, this chapter shows that the use of auctions

iv
can be successfully applied to the provision of publjc goods in the case of compensation
demanded .
(100 pages)
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The great thing in thi s world is not
where we stand as in what direction we are moving,
Oliver Wendell Holmes
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The United Nations conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 encouraged
participating countries to be more aware and eager to tackle environmental problems
they all faced, including global warming, forest preservation, and animal and plant
preservation. At approximately the same time in Europe, the Common Agricultural
Policy took a new turn by attempting to incorporate environmental issues such as
pollution problems associated with farming practice as policy. The reform it produced
was based on a system of direct payments to farmers to either reduce pollutants or to
cease production on selected lands .
In 1997, a study was financed by the French Ministry of the Environment to
evaluate the costs of preserving riparian habitat on the banks of the Garonne River, in
the southwest of France. This study was undertaken to assess the cost through foregone
harvests and site management to landowners resulting from the implementation of the
preservation program along the river that would require landowners to leave more idle
land on the riverbanks.
The contingent valuation method (CVM) was used to study households that
currently own land on the banks of the river. The CVM is an empirical technique used
to measure environmental benefits or costs due to a change in a nonmarket good or
environmental qualiry. This method has become one of the most widely used
nonmarket valuation techniques over the past years. Its predominance is due to its
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flexibility and ability to estimate total value, including nonuse value. It was necessary
to use this nonmarket technique to evaluate both out-of-pocket and psychological costs
included in the overall cost to owners participating in the preservation program.
Another important aim of this study was to evaluate the accuracy of the
willingness-to-accept (WTA) format in the CVM by comparing simple WTA estimates
with WT A values obtained in a contingent first-price , sealed-bid auction.
The first essay presents the results of this study, which found that the CVM can be
successfully applied in the case of offered compensation. In effect, respondents give
very "reasonable values" close to the market rental cost ofland. The econometric
analysis undertaken reveals a systematic association between various socioeconomic
variables of interest and the expressed WTA format for foregone land use .
The second essay takes us one step further, as we evaluate the use of the WTA
format in the CVM. We compare mean WTA estimates obtained with the simple openformat model with those obtained with a first-price, sealed-bid auction.
Results indicate that respondents placed in the auction setting gave lower WTA
measures for both farmers and nonfarmer groups. The mean WTA measures, however,
do not appear to be statistically significantly different. In other words, the "simple"
open-format WTA measures determined in this study were very close to individuals'
true values as measured by the auction format setting.

3
CHAPTER2
RIPARIAl ZONE PROTECT!O

FOR DETERMTN1NG

COMPENSATION REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW
LAND FROM PRODUCTIVE USE 1

Abstract

The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is used to study households that
currently own land on the banks of the river. More precisely, a willingness-to-accept
(WT A) format was used to estimate the loss to owners for no longer being able to farm
riverbank areas. Results indicate that the CVM can be successfully applied in the case
of offered compensation. The econometric analysis undertaken reveals a systematic
association between various socioeconomic variables of interest and the expressed
WTA format for foregone land use.

Introduction

The United Nations conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 encouraged participating
countries to be more aware and eager to tackle environmental problems they all faced,
including global warming, forest preservation, and animal and plant preservation. At
approximately the same time in Europe, the Common Agricultural Policy took a new
tum, by anempting to incorporate environmental issues, such as pollution problems
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associated with farming practice as policy. The reform it produced was based on a
system of direct payments to farmers to eitber reduce pollutants or to cease production
on lands deemed to be environmentally sensitive (Bonnieux and Rainelli, 1996).
In 1997, a study was financed by the French Ministry of Environment to evaluate
the costs of protecting riparian habitat on the banks of the Garonne River. The
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is used to study households that currently own
land on the banks of tbe river. More precisely, a willingness-to-accept (WTA) format
was used to estimate the loss to owners for no longer being able to farm riverbank
areas. Results of this study are reported and analyzed in this paper.
The CVM is an empirical technique often used to measure environmental benefits
due to a change in a nonmarket good or environmental quality. This method has
become one of the most widely used nonmarket valuation techniques over the past
years. Its predominance is due to its flexibility and ability to estimate total value,
including non-use value. Most of the time, the willingness-to-pay (WTP) approach is
chosen, though often in different formats (i.e., closed-ended, open, iterative bidding).
Due to the nature of the allocation of property right in this case, WTP fails to measure
the costs of foregone use on privately owned land. In effect, the pre-survey used to
determine how land-use rights were distributed indicates that those rights were strongly
perceived by landowners. It would have been politically very difficult to ask owners
their WTP for an imposed foregone use on land they considered their own. This
formatting of the question would have led owners to believe that they were not free to
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use their land the way they choose to. The alternative measure of WT A allows us to
capture this cost.
Relatively few CVM studies have been conducted using this format (Kunreuther
et al., 1987; Shyamsundar and Kramer, 1996), primarily because of lack of upper bound
in the minimum compensation demanded. This problem is handled in the current study
by using a discrete/continuous choice model. The questionnaire is designed in such a
way that extreme values are automatically screened out. This paper seeks to explore
further the potential for undertaking valuation exercises using the WT A format.

Study Site

Ecologists agree on the important role played by riparian forests along rivers.
Important functions include flooding mitigation, temporary reservoirs, stock of water
surplus the river is unable to evacuate at any given time, bank erosion prevention, water
quality improvement by filtering nitrates and other compounds from run-off, and preserve
habitat for plant and animal species (Buckley, 1989; Cattan and Laurans, 1996).
Expanded urbanization, as well as some current farming practices, has resulted in
deforestation along the Garonne River (DeCamps, 1987). The site under study begins
north of Toulouse and continues approximately 100 krn downstream in the direction of
Bordeaux (see map in Appendix A). This is mainly a rural zone, except along the
outskirts of Toulouse. There are approximately 300 households who own land along
the length of the river. These households typically sub-rent, farm , or live on the land,
or some combination of the three. Often a small strip ofland along the river is already
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left unused . Since the Garonne River is part of France's "Domanial Rivers" (meaning
they are in the State's eminent domain), owners are legally required to leave a strip of
land of3 meters unused as a right of way. Sometimes owners leave more than 3 meters
along the river's edge in order to reduce land flooding or bank destruction, which
effectively reduces their lot size. The preservation program in this study suggests that
owners expand that strip of land left untouched.
For those who utilize the land right up to the river bank, any widening of the
right-of-way due to the proposed preservation program may represent an important
economic loss, while this economic loss may be insignificant for those who do not use
it. Thus, we would expect the latter group to indicate lower WTA values.

Theory and Method

Theoretical Framework
ln our model, we consider that agricultural land provides a variety of "nonmarket" services, including wildlife habitat, scenic vistas, and recreation . While
landowners can obtain revenue from the use, sale, or development of agricultural land,
no revenue can normally be derived from the externalities provided by agricultural
land. As a consequence, it may be undervalued by the market (Halstead, 1984).
Therefore, we take into account the dual characteristic of land as a production factor
(farming) and as a consumption good (collecting minor products like dead wood for
heating, but also as residential space, garden, yard), and consider that owners derive an
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economic rent from the services by this factor for which there is a positive market
demand (Just eta!., 1982).
For simplicity, we assume that there are on ly two ways an indi vidual can allocate
the land they own--they can either leave it idle or else produce. Idle land provides
utility to the individual, such as the enjoyment of the sight and the protection of riparian
habitat for animals and plants. If, on the other hand, the owner decides to use the land
for production, the individual gets rent in return which allows for the purchase of
goods and services. We make the assumption here that the preservation program
cannot represent an increase in welfare. Accepting to widen the strip of land left
untouched would result in a loss of welfare for landowners. If it did not, landowners
interested in riparian preservation would have widened the unused port ion of land on
thei r own. The total amount of land is assumed to be fixed . The individual is faced
with the choice of buying different bundles of goods (C) at a given price p (nonnalized
to one) and enjoying her idle land (H) with the rent on land (w) as its price.

(!)

where L represents the total amount of land owned by the river, and RL represents
productive land.
Let the utility functi on be:

utility= U(C, H)

The individual can purchase consumption items (C) by allocating some land to

(2)
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productive use. The income comes from productive land, as well as from some
exogenous income(!\} If the yearly rental price on productive land (per hectare) is
given by w, the income constraint is then given by

C = wRL + N

(3)

Rewriting the budget constraint directly in terms of C and H, we have

C = w(L-

H)-~

(4a)

or

C + wH = wL + N = V

(4b)

The quantity wL + N represents the total purchasing power available to
individuals. It is often called their "full income" (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).
Individuals can allocate their land to productive use (for real income and consumption
C) or leave it idle and get benefits from it, like sightseeing for example. They get
utility from the benefits associated wi th owning a lot by the river. Equation 4 shows
that the opportunity cost of enjoying idle land is w per year and per hectare--it is equal
to earnings foregone by not producing on the lots. Further, we assume that productivity
on the land is homogenous. In other words, land is found to be as productive on the
river's edge as it is deeper in the lot and therefore w is constant.
Setting up the Lagrangean,
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l£ = U(C,H) +_A.(w L + N- C- wH)

(5)

The first-order condition for a maximum solution is

oL!oC = 6U/6C - A= 0

(6)

6L16H = 6U/6H - w A. = 0

(7)

Combining Eqs . (6) and (7),

(6U/6C)/(6U/6H) = w

(8)

In order to maximize utility, given the real rental price, w, the individual will , therefore,
choose to produce on that amount of land for which the marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) of idle land for consumption (C) is equal tow. We will assume for convenience
that the MRS of idle land for consumption is diminishing (second derivative is
negative).
Solving for Eqs. (6) and (7), we obtain the Marshallian demand functions for idle
land . A change in w can then be analyzed in a manner identical to a change in pri ce in
the consumer case. By totally differentiating the demand functions , we are able to
show the two effects at work: the substitution and the income effects. When w
increases, the opportunity cost of idle land rises. The individual must give up more in
lost rent for each hectare of land being idle. The substitution effect of an increase in w
on the amount of idle land will therefore be negative. As idle land becomes more
expensive, there is reason to supply less of it. Assuming that idle land is a normal
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good, the income effect o f an increase in w on idle land is positive. As w increases, the
individual can afford having more of it. Thus the substitution and income effects work
in opposite directions.
Since the total amount of land L is assumed to be fixed , deriving the demand for
idle land is equivalent to deriving the supply for productive land ~(w,N) . The amount
of land for production depends on both the rent and on the amount of real exogenous
income received. Since idle land is considered as being a normal good, as N increases,
the demand for idle land H increases, and therefore the supply of productive land
decreases or, more formall y, oR;oN < 0.
To study the effect of rent change on productive land supply (o~/ow) we can also
consider the dual problem to the indi vidual 's primary utility-maximizing problem. We
minimize the "full" expenditure (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).

C = w(L - H) .._

= V

(9)

or

V

= C- wRL = N (see Eq. 3)

(10)

s. to

U=U(C, H)

(!!)

Solving tills minimizing problem will yield to the same results as solving the utilitymaximizing problem.

II

Sf= C- wRL + A.(U(C,H))

(I 2)

We can now apply the envelope theorem to the minimum val ue for these extra
expenditures calculated in the dual problem, and we obtain the compensated demand
for idle land.

dSf/ow

= oV/ow = - RL

(13)

The idle land demand Eq. is given by (13) using H = L- RL. Since utility is held
constant in the dual expenditure minimizing approach, Eq. 13 should be interpreted as a
"compensated" (constant utility) productive land supply function , which we will denote
by R',(w,U) to differentiate it from the uncompensated productive land suppl y function
R',(w,

).
ow we can use these concepts to derive a Slutsky-type Eq. for the supply of

productive land RL that reflects the substi tution and income effects that result from
changes in the real rent.
Since utility maximization and expenditure minimization must imply the same
choice, the outlay in the original problem must be the expenditure minimum in the dual
problem (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). Therefore, we have:

R'p(w,U) = Rp(w,V(w,U))

(14)

Quantity supplied is identical fo r the compensated and uncompensated supp ly functio ns
when the individual's income is exactly what is needed to attain the required utility
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level. Above tbat point, the individual's income is increased with the compensated
supply curve, so more is supplied than with the uncompensated supply curve.
Panial differentiation of both sides of Eq. (14) with respect tow yields

o R'! ow = o R!6w + o R.ioV. oV/ow

(15)

using the envelope theorem from ( 10), we have:

o R'p/ow = o R!6w - RL . o R!6V

( 16)

Introducing a slightly different notation for the compensated productive land function,

(17)

and rearranging terms gives the final Slutsky Eq. for productive land supply:

(18)

where 0 R!Ow/u-uo represents the substitution effect in which utility is held constant, and
RL . o R!OV represents the income effect, which is analytically equivalent to an
appropriate change in exogenous income. The substitution effect was negative for idle
land, and hence is positive for productive land. Higher rent leads to an increase in
amount of productive land being supplied. Similarly, the income effect, positive for idle
land, is now negative, a higher rent allowing the individual to supply less productive land.

13

So far, we have looked at the effects of a change in price (w). However, thi s
preservation program, as often do environmental policies, implies a change in the
quantity of idle land supplied (an increase in H). By totally differenti ati ng

V(w) = C- wRL

and

U. = U(C,H)

( 19)

We get:

dV = dC- wdRL - Rl dw

(20)

dU. = (6U/6C)dC + (6U/6H)dH

(21)

To see how a change in idl e land H can be co mpensated by a change in
expenditure V, so that the individua l's utility stays constant (dU . = 0), we can write:

dC = dV + wdRL

(22)

dC = [-(6U/6H)/(6U/6C)]dH

(23)

Therefore,

dV = -wdR, - (6U/6H)/(6U/IiC)dH

(24)

In the case of an imposed increase in H, -(liU/6H)/(6U/6C)dH in Eq. 24 is negative
[both C and H being normal goods, (6U/6H)>O and (6U/6C)>O], and- wdR, is also
negative. Change in expenditures must be equal to loss in revenue associated with
change in the amount of productive land supplied and the value the individual attributes
to the imposed change in quantity of idle land (H). Participating in a preservation
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program means a loss in utility for the individual, since some land is "taken away" from
production or personal use. The individual is now on a lower level of utility (i .e. , Ul).
Fi g. 2. 1 describes such a situation. lfthe individual is currently using th e total
amount ofland to produce marketable commodities, she is at point A with utility level
U0 and gets Y0 amount of revenue. If, on the other hand, the individual prefers to enjoy
more idle along the river, there is Jess revenue generated and the indi vidual is at point B
and utility level U,.
Considering that the supplier faces an imposed increase in H (from H0 to H 1), the
compensating surplus (CS) is defmed as being the amount of income that must be given
to the individual after the change in quantity for her to still be on her original
indifference cuJVe U0 .
In the case of this imposed increase in quantity of idle land, the CS represents the
individual's WTA to stay on the original level of welfare U"' in spite of change in
quantity. Equivalent surplus (ES) is the maximum amount one is willing to pay (WTP)

c

H
Fig. 2.1. Utility maximization for individuals owning riparian land.

IS
to keep getting Ho (or to keep producing L - H,) on the lower indifference curve U 1•
Let us define w

=

w. H (p, Hh, U*) the inverse compensated supply fu nction for

H"; w. H(.) is the rent that would induce the individual to supply H" amo unt of idl e
land in order to attain a utility level of U* , given that she could buy pri vate goods (C) at
p (numerai re).
Let w0 = w. (p,H"0,U *0) , and w 1=w. (p,H".,U*,) denote the rent that would have
supported H"0 and H"., respectively.

CS = E(p,w,H 0 ,U0)

-

E(p,w,H , ,U0) = HhOJ""''w* (p,Hh,U*0) dH"

(25)

ES = E(p,w,H 0,U 1)

-

E(p,w,H 1 ,U 1) = Hnof ""' w*(p, H",U* ,) dH"

(26)

By asking individuals their WTP/WT A to participate in the program, we are
tryin g to estimate the change in the util ity level implied by accepting to defer personal
use or productive use of the land to a preservation program of the riverbanks. As
shown in Fig. 2.2, the two estimates may have different values.
The disparity between WT A and WTP measures has been extensively
documented and several explanations have been suggested. It is sometim es attri buted
to certain psychological factors. For example, Boyce et al. (! 992) expl ain it using the
concept of intrinsic values . Individuals m ay want to preserve an environmental
amenity for moral (or other) reasons. These values would appear more easily in WTA
estimates than in WTP measures.
Kahneman et al . (1990) based their argument on an endowment or the "loss
aversion" effect. The endowment effect states that an individual attributes a subjective
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c
ES

cs

Fig. 2.2. Difference between compensating surplus (CS) and equivalent
surplus (ES) for a quantity restriction.

value to gains and losses--winning 50 USD does not have the same value as losi ng 50
USD. This effect exists when "an individual becomes attached to the good because he
or she is often rewarded for doing so in many contexts" (Shogren et al. , 1994). This
attachment leads the respondent to overestimate the minimum WT A compared to the
WTP . Shogren et al. (1994) tested and rejected the hypothesis of an existing
endowment effect. Rather, their results seem to support the economic explanation of
difference between WTA and WTP, provided by Hanemann (1991), who explained the
divergence between the two measures in terms of substitution and income effects. The
greater the income effect, and/or the smaller the substitution effect, the greater the
disparity between WTP and WT A measures. As substitutability decreases, the trade-off
between two goods x and y becomes less desirable, implying a greater disparity
between the two estimates (see Shogren et al., 1994).
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The Contingent Valuation Format
The overall cost to owners of participating in the preservation program includes
both out-of-pocket and psychological costs. The results of the VanKooten and
Schmitz (1992) project indicate that "current economic incentives offered to
agricultural producers are inadequate because they ignore non-market costs." A positive
attitude toward habitat preservation cannot be used as a substitute for monetary
incentives. ln order to capture both the market and the non-market costs of the
proposed preservation program, it was necessary to use a non-market technique to
evaluate the costs ofleaving the land idle. The CVM was chosen for its flexibility and
its abi lity to measure total value.
The nature of the privately held property rights by landowners has an important
implication as to how the swvey should be composed. A pre-swvey was used to
determine how land-use rights were distributed. It was found that land-use rights were
strongly perceived by landowners. This provided the primary motivation for utilizing
the WT A format. In effect, it would have been politically very difficult to ask owners
their WTP for an imposed foregone use on land they considered their own.
We will cite here, for illustration purposes, some examples to shed light on the
sociopolitical situation in France when it comes to subsidizing farmers . In 1998,
approximately I ,500 farmers demanded greater government subsidies by blocking the
runway of a local airport in western France, by vandalizing train equipment, causing
delays throughout the region, and by keeping up barricades on a major highway. The
four-day blockade ended after France's agriculture minister promised to soften the blow
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of cauliflower falling prices. In early 1999, large numbers of French farmers converged
on the European parliament building in Strasbourg, to protest against proposed cuts in
European Union farm subsidies. The proposed cuts were a consequence of the French
government's commitment to keep down the budget deficit to qualify for the new single
European currency. Finally, no later than at the beginning of December 1999, chicken
farmers protested in Paris streets to ask for greater financial aid. In recent years, the
differentiation of compensation based on animal density per forage area or permanent
grassland area, for example, has been added to direct payment distribution in favor of
extensi ve farming. This measure aimed to prevent oversupply by means of a
disincentive for intensive production and to give an incentive for the maintenance of
less productive land, which will contribute to the preservation of landscape and
biodiversity. Our approach in this study follows the current tendency in France.
Using the WTA format, respondents were first asked if they were interested or not
in participating in a program. This allowed us to screen out high WT A estimates. In
effect, we can think of respondents not being interested in participating in the program
as having high WTA bids. In other words, the compensation needed for them to accept
to participate would be high. If the respondents' answer was positive to the
participation question, they were then asked their minimum WT A.
The elicitation method used was the open format model. The open format method
was chosen for several reasons . First, since respondents were geographically situated
close to each other, often including strong family ties, we wanted to avoid suggesting
values that they would have been able to compare with one another. The second reason
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is more pragmatic. Suggesting values would have been difficult. If the suggested
values were perceived as being "too low," owners would be upset and suspect the
political organizations themselves of misch ief (i.e., Chamber of Agriculture, Ministry
of Environment, etc.). On the other hand, suggesting large values would have meant
that the study and programs proposed were not credible, or it might have encouraged
them to give high WTA estimates.
It is useful at this point to step back a little and reflect on how the binary question
preceding the open format one relates to the economic modeling of an individual
maximizing utility.
We have seen that by asking individuals their WTA estimate to participate to the
preservation program, we were effectively trying to estimate the supplier surplus (i.e., the
area above the supply curve). In practice, however, this question is preceded by a binary
question asking respondents whether or not they would be willing to participate in the
program. The problem formulates as follows . The maximum utility that an individual
can obtain by choosing alternative i (in the set of alternatives J) depends on the price of
the good and the person's income (as well as some characteristics of the person). This
maximum-attainable utility, given alternative i, can be written (Train, 1993)

Y, = Y, (p, y, Z;, s, w;)

(27)

where z1 represents the observed characteristics of each alternative i in J, x is the
quantity of the good, y is the person's income, s represents the observed characteristics
of the person, p, is the price of the good, and w1 represents all unobserved factors

20
This function is called the indirect utility function , that is, it is the maximum
utility an individual can attain given that she has chosen alternative i. She will choose
alternative I if and only if

for allj in J, j "i

(28)

Considering the random utility approach, the individual is assumed to always
choose the alternative with the highest utility. However, the utilities associated with
each alternative are not known to the analyst with certainty. The indirect utility is
therefore decomposed into observed and unobserved parts,

(29)

where e, is a function of unobserved variables, and V; is simply the difference between
Y, and e,.
With this approach, utilities are treated as random due to observational
deficiencies resulting from different factors such as: unobserved attributes, unobserved
tastes variations, measurement errors, and use of proxy variables (Ben-Akiva and
Lerman, 1997). The researcher looks at the probability that for any individual, the
utility of an alternative will exceed the utilities of all other feasible alternatives.
Therefore, the probabil ity of alternative i being chosen is

P; = prob(Y; (p;, y, Z;, s, w;)> Yi (p,. y,

z,, s, wi), for all j in J, j

" i]

P, = prob(V; (p;, y, Z;, s) + e;> Vi (p,, y, z,, s) + e,, for all j in J, j " i]

I

,,

(30)
(31)
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P, = prob[e1 - e, < V, (p,, y, z, s)- V1 (p, y, ~· s)].

(32)

(In effect, as utilities are ordinal only, only the difference matters.)

The Econometric Modelin g
Dealing with the first question (discrete choice), we have to decide on the
functio nal forms ofV and e. As is often the case, we will assume that Vis linear in
parameters, while the disturbances will be assumed to follow a Pro bit model. The
reasons for this choice will be explained later when we look at the Heckman ( 1979)
model.
The disturbances are viewed as the sum of a large number of unobserved but
independent components. As the sample size increases, the disturbances tend to be
normal . Assuming that e, and e1 are both normal with mean zero and variances a., and

a., respectively, the term e1 - e, is also normally distributed with mean zero and
variance a.,+a~-a,i =a' (which can, for simplici ty, be assumed to be equal to 1). We
can use this result to solve for the choice probabilities as follows (Kmenta, 1986)

Pi = prob [ei - e, < v,- V)

7' ~exp[ -7 (:-.)']de,cr
1

c:•-c

1
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.J21to
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~ J
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0
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]
(
ex -J.l ' du=¢ - ' - - '
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o

(33)

As shown above, respondents were given the opportunity to select for themselves
whether they participated in the survey or not. Moreover, only respondents the most
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interested in the preservation program gave their WT A bids. In other words, those not
interested in tbe program screened themselves out by refusing to participate--we will
examine later the reasons for such refusal. In other words, we are dealing with the
problem of limited dependent variable (Kmenta, 1986). We only observe the WTA
measure over a positive range. In other words, our sample is censored.
This phenomenon is often described in tbe economic literature as the selfselection bias, or sample selection bias. The non-responses to the survey or the WTA
question hold different expected values for the amenity than comparable individuals
who do respond. The potenti al for sample selection bias in mail surveys is particularly
high compared to in-person surveys and phone surveys. This problem stems from the
self-administered character of mail surveys and the concomitant lack of control the
researchers have over the process of getting the respondent's cooperation in eliciting
answers (Mi tchell and Carson, 1989).
It is useful at this point to define sample selection bias more precisely in
mathematical terms. To do this, we use Heckman's (1979) steps.
To match the survey design for estimating the respondents' WTA, the simplest
idea wou ld be to fit the following Eqs. for each individual:

(34)
(35)

where

X J;

is a I x K; vector of exogenous regressors, such as income, size of the

property, number oflots owned by the river etc.; pi is a Ki xI vector of parameters; and
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Y, and Y 2, respectively, represent the acceptance to participate to the program, and the
WT A estimate.

E(u;,) = 0
E(uj;, ui';.) =
=

0,i

~

(36)

a ii' , i=i'

(37)

i'

(38)

The final assumption is a consequence of a random sampling scheme. The
regressor matrix is of full rank so that if al l data were available, the parameters of each
Eq . could be estimated by least squares.
The population regression function for Eq. (34) could be written as

(i = I, ... I)

(39)

However, since we do not observe all Y 2 of our sample, the regression function
for the subsample of available data is

E(Y2;1 X 2, sample selection rule) = X 2; P2+ E(u 2; I sample selection rule)

(40)

If the conditional expectation ofu 2; is 0, then there is no bias, the regression function
for the selected sample is the same as the population regression function , and least
square estimation can be used to estimate the parameters

P2•

The only cost of having an

incomplete sample would then be a loss in efficiency.
If, however, E (U;)

#

0, as in the case of sample selection bias, then we face more

serious problems. In our case, data are available only on Y 2; ifY,;>O, while ifY ,; = 0,

24
there are no observations on Y 2,. In other words, we face the problem of censored data
on Y 2,.

E(Y 2;I X2;, sampl e selection ru le)

(41)
(42)

lfu 1; and u" are not independent, then

(43)

The selected samp le regression function depends on X 1; and X2;. The final tenn ofEq.
(43) is omitted in the estimation ofEq. (35) . The bias resulting from non-randomly
selected sam ples (here self-selection) to estimate behav ioral relationships is similar to
the problem of omitted variables.
The Heckman's approach takes care of this problem. Its procedure makes use of
the infonnation contained in the yes/no responses (Y 1;) and corrects for the sample bias
that would otherwise be caused by using only the subset of quantitative responses in the
regress ion estim ation (Howe et al. , 1994).
We assume that p(u li,u2;) is a bi variate nonnal density. Its density function can be
written as

where~.=

E(U;;), Var(U;;)

=

Fi;

fo r j =i, and the correlation between uli and u2; is p
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The joint normal distribution can be standardized (0, I) by sening o 1= o2 =I, and

2
I
p(U ,, U,,)= [
, ,, ] exp ( - ( - I ') ' {U"+U ,2 ,- 2pU,u,;}
2 1-p )
21t(l- p-)

(45)

It is assumed to be fully characterized by

E(u/ ) =

for j=i

O;;

The joint cumulative distribution of random variables Y" andY 2; having the above joint
bivariate densi ty is

Cll(h,k;p)=

1
1
' ) ][
,xi'L. exp[ ( '' I - p- 2 1-p

4

:, -2U,u,,+u;, ]dU,,du,

4

C 6)

where u " = hand u2; = k . We consider that the distribution is truncated from below
(i .e., only the values ofu" that exceed his used). The resulting joint distribution has
density function (Johnson and Kotz, 1972)

P~".u'' (u", u,,) = [ 1_~(h)] exp[ - 2( 1~ p' )(u;,2u, u,. + u;.)]
( "> h)

(47)

26
If the error terms have a bivariate normal distribution, then the conditional mean ofu 2,
with respect ofu li can be written as (Greene, 1990, theorem 22.4)

E(u 2;1 >-XnP 1)= po,A.,

(48)

E(u,;l u n > - X nP 1) = (o 12 o,lo 1o 2)A.i

(49)

E(u 1 ,l u ~o >-X ~o P 1 ) = [o 12/ o 1] A.i

(50)

E(ulilu li > -X ,,p ,) = [o ,,lo ,] A.i

(51)

where, A., = <j>(Z;)/1 - <I>( Z,)

(52)

where, <I> and <I> are, respectively, the density and distribution function for a standard
normal variable, and

(53)

"A.," is the inverse of Mill's ratio, also called the hazard rate; the greater "A.," the greater
the selectivity bias.
The full statistical model for normal population disturbances can now be
developed. The conditional regression function for selected samples may be written as

E(Y liiX li,Y ,;> O)=XnP , + [o,,lo,]A.,
E(Y 2 ,IX2»Y ~o>O) = X,;p,

+ [o 1,1o.JA.,

(54)
(55)

Adding disturbances to our Equations (24) and (25), we reach the model

(56)

27
(57)

where

E(vu) = E(v") = 0

E(v,.IX 1., A1, u,. > - X ,,p ,) = 0

(58)

E(v2,IX2., A., u,. >-X"p ,) = 0

(59)

E(v,v,.IX,. X2,. A.i. u">-X.,p,) = 0

(60)

fori * i'.

In summary, we took the "omitted" variable A., out of the error tem1 u21 and put it
back in the Eq ., [o 12 /o ,] being the coefficient of A,= <jl(Z,)/ 1- <l> (Z,). If[o 1/ o 1] is
significant, then we can conclude that there was no selection bias (we test for the
hypothesis

flo: [o ,;o ,] = 0).

We do, however, still have the problem of

heteroscedasticity, as shown by Eq . (6lc).
Since we are dealing with a truncated bivariate normal distribution, the variance
can be wrin en as (Greene, 1990, Theorem 22.4)

E(vz;2IXz,. A;. u" >-X"p,) = o22 [1 -p2{A; (A., - Z)}]

(6la)

E(vz, 2IX2,. A,, u, , >-X"p ,) = odl - p2(A,Z- A./ )]

(6lb)

E(v2,2IX 2,, A,, U ~; >-X ,,p ,) = o 22 [1 - p 2) + p 2(l+A,Z- A,Z)]

(61c)

where
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(62)

and

o::: 1 + z;t. ,- A.;'::: 1.

(63)

The least squares estimators ofP 2, and o 12 I o 1 are unbiased but inefficient. This is due
to the heteroscedasticity apparent from the above Eq. Further, we have (Heckman,
1979)

(64)

In our censored sample, we do not know Y 2, ifY,, = 0, but we know Xn for the
observations Y" = 0. Therefore, we first estimate the parameters of the probability that
Y " = 1 (i.e., P t/o 1) using a Probit analysis. This is the first step of Heckman's two-step
procedure. It enables one to obtain consistent estimates of knowing P / o 1 (= b*). We
can then estimate z,. and hence A.,. The second step involves going back to our
regression function (56) and replacing A., by our new estimated (A.,) and applying the
ordinary least squares method using then observations for which n= 1.

In summary, the first step is to estimate a Probit model where the dependent
variable is 1 or 0, depending on whether y" is observed or not. This is done on the whole
sample. This provides a consistent estimator of Z, and A., . The consistent estimator of A.,
is then inserted in Eq. (56) and the second step of the two-step procedure is the
application ofleast squares to the resulting Eq. The estimator ofp , produced by this
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process is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. The weighted least squares
method can be successfully used to address the remaining heteroskedasticity problem.

Survey Design

The questionnaire (see Appendix B) was first refined and critically examined by
ecologists and lawyers from the Departmental Chamber of Agriculture, to see if the
questionnaire was realistic. A pretest was then conducted in the winter of 1997 with
five landowners with property adjacent to the river.
A list of landowners was obtained from the Office of Land Titles, and they were
all contacted by mail in the spring of 1997. The questionnaire was originally
constructed for face-to-face interviews. However, due to organizational and financial
constraints, a mail survey was used.
To encourage their response, a lonery was organized. A lot of200 USD (I ,000
francs) was to be won among those who answered the questionnaire, even partially. One
month following the mail survey, respondents were contacted by phone and were asked if
they wanted help in clarifying any questions or problems they could have in answering
the questionnaire. A meeting was organized if they desired. Three people requested a
meeting.
Three programs of habitat preservation were suggested to respondents, each
involving different degrees of involvement. The duration of the program was I 0 years,
and subsequently renewable. These programs are described below.
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I. No upkeep: You provide the land. The strip ofland allocated to the program
is not to be maintained. Its width is between I 0 and 50 meters. This protected zone
would allow for preservation and reproduction of different species.

2. Upkeep of a trail: You provide the land . You maintain a 3 meters wide trail.
This trail may be used by hunters, fishermen , or hikers. The upkeep of the trail is your
responsibility. The width of this strip ofland is between I 0 and 50 meters.
3. Upkeep+ wood: You provide the land. You maintain a 3 meters wide trail at
your charge. You plant the trees and bushes, which are supplied to you, and you are
responsible for the upkeep ofthe land twice a year. The upkeep consists of clearing
brushwood, getting rid of dead wood and garbage. The heavy upkeep work (e.g.,
cutting trees) is also your responsibility, but the wood belongs to you.
Respondents first stated if they were interested in any of the programs, and then
gave their WTA as well as the width of strip of land they would be willing to provide
(see Fig. 2.3).

II.

To which one of these program(s) would you accept to participate?
program I

12.

program 2

program 3

(You accept to participate in several programs) Which program do you prefer?
program 1

program 2

program 3

13.

You accept to parricipa<e in a program) What would be the strip of land width you would accept
to allocate to this program?
meters

14.

\Vhat is the minimum compensation that you would have to receive to participate in this program?
_ _ _ __ francs

Fig. 2.3. Form respondents were asked to complete.
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Discussion of the Sample

Socioeconomic Status of the Surveyed
Population
The results indi cated in this part are exp lained in more details in Broadhead
(1997). The total population surveyed was 315 households. The response rate was
30% completed survey. This response rate is comparable to other mail surveys. The
sample size is also comparable to other CV surveys. VanKooten and Schmitz (1992),
for example, conducted 66 interviews. Mitchell and Carson (1989) made a review of
different CV surveys and the size of the samples surveyed (see Appendix C).
As shown by Harrison and Les ley (1996), a small sample can be as effective as a
larger one in that it leads essentially to the same conclusions (and is less costly). The
authors obtained the same damage estimates using a model of the behavior of students
to predict the behavior of all of the adult citizens of the United States, in the case of the
Exxon Valdez 1989 oil spill.
Our sample is consisted of 40% farmers and 60% non-farmers. Among nonfarmers, a major portion of them is represented by retirees (56). The average age for
our sample is 57 years (with a maximum of92 years and a minimum of26 years). This
tendency is common in the rural community both at the regional and the national level
(see Table 2.1). This average is slightly higher for non-farmers.
Almost all respondents were male, and 87% of them were married. On average,
they had 2.1 children. This result is slightly greater than the average for France. It is
worth noting that farmers often lived with a member of their family other than children.
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Table 2. 1
Age distribution
Variable

< 35 years

35-59 years

> 59 years

Sample

12.5%

60.5%

27.0%

Region

18.0%

52.0%

30.0%

Source: Tableaux Economiques Midi-Pyrenees, INSEE (1996).

This is particularly true as they often became farmers after their parents and the
business is of family type, as we will see in a subsequent chapter.
One question in the survey asked respondents for the household monthly net
income. It is interesting here to note that beside the expected reservations this question
triggered, farmers had often a genuine difficulty in indicating what their revenue
amounted to. This is most likely due to complicated tax and subsidy measures. Fiftyfi ve percent of the individuals surveyed indicated earning less than 2,000 USD per
month/year and per household, and 29% indicated a revenue comprised between 2,000
USD and 3,600 USD.

Characteristics of the Property
Let us first consider the characteristics of the farms. Results show that 68% of
them are of family type. In other words, the farm is legally run by one or more family
members, in opposition with a business-like legal status. Moreover, farmers tend to be
farmers from one generation to another. Only 4% of farmers indicated that they
represented the first generation of farmers in their family.
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The average size of the farms is 57 hectares. More precisely, 81% of farmers own
more than 20ha. This result are on the higher side of results observed at the regional
level, where 55% of farmers are found to own more than 20ha (see Table 2.2).
For non-farmers, the average size of the property is llha. The majority of them
(8 1% as well) owns less than I Oha.
For the purpose of our study, and to better understand the current situation on the
banks of the Garonne River, respondents were asked different questions on the current
situation of the lots that they owned lining the river. Those questions were related to
the current activity on the lots, their geographical situation, and their size.
On average, farmers own between 3 and 4 lots by the river, while non-farmers
own 2. The average area for those lots is close to 4ha (farmers = 5, non-farmers= 3).
More precisely, a large majority of farmers own between I and Sha of land by the river
(50% for non-farmers) . However, since there is a large number of non-farmers owning
some land by the river, the total amount of land owned by this group is less than the
total amount of land owned by farmers on the riverbanks. This may be ofhigh interest
policy wise.

Table 2.2
Property size, in hectares (ha)
Variable

< 5ha

5-!0ha

ll-20ha

21 -50ha

> 50ha

Total
100.0%

Fanners

3.0%

3.0%

12.0%

37.0%

44.0%

Non-fanners

61.0%

20.0%

5.0%

7.0%

7.0%

100.0%

Region

18.0%

10.4%

16.7%

35.2%

19.6%

100.0%
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We obtained the same tendency when dealing with the lots linear (i.e., the
measure of the length, in meters, of the lot running along the river). Individually,
farmers own more land by the river, but they are under represented compared to nonfarmers when considering the overall size of the land owned on the river's banks.
The linear of the lot owned by farmers is generally larger per household (75% of
farmers own more than 100 meters, while only 34% of non-farmers fit in this category),
but the total linear is larger for non-farmers than for farmers. Interestingly enough,
many owners were not able to indicate the size (or the exact location) of their lots. This
can be explained by the very dynamic nature of the riverbed. It must be added here that
frequently flooded areas become state property. Therefore, the ownership of the
landscape is subject to frequent and unexpected changes.
For farmers, irrigated crops such as com, soybeans, and sorghum, along with
poplar plantations, remain the main activities (51%). Often, several activities are
conducted on the same lot (e.g., com in the field and poplar on the edge of the river).
For non-farmers, poplar farming represents an important activity (39%). One reason
explaining the success of the poplar plantation (not specific to this area) is the design of
the tax system in France. In effect, such plantations are subject to a 30-year levy on
property taxes.
Thirty-four percent of non-farmers also indicated renting the lots out for
agricultural use. Finally, 30% own a house on those lots. This last information leads
us to expect that the preservation programs may incite stronger reservations among
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non-fanners (about public access to their backyard, or depending on the exact location
of their house on the lot).
As mentioned previously, a large proportion of owners indicated not using their
lots up to the river's edge (78%). The main reason given to explain such a situation is
geographical (e.g., steep banks, existing trails, etc.). But also, some respondents
indicated doing this to either protect the banks, or because their lot was too small to
manage effectively.
Among people who declared not producing on those lots, almost half of them also
indicated that they were not maintaining the lots. The average width of strips not
maintained is 18 meters, with a minimum of3 meters, and a maximum of80 meters.

Results

Empirica l Results

Thirty-eight people answered positively to the CV question and gave their
minimum WT A bid for at least one program. The average WT A we obtained for
Program I is 275 USD/hectare (1373.5 francs/ha). Farmers indicated a greater
minimum compensation. The average WTA for farmers was indeed 546 USD/hectare
(2731 francs/ha), while it was only 38 USD/hectare (192.5 francs/ha) for non-fanners.
The first program received the most favorable responses. Consistently with what
we expected, Programs 2 and 3 revealed larger WTA because they require more
involvement from respondents. This result reflects the boundaries of the market rental
rates for this area (e.g., between 26 USD and 500 USD (130 and 2,500 francs) ,
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depending on the potential productivity of the lot). The values are also consistent with
payments being made for existing conservation (e.g.,from 20 USD to 340 USD for the
Midi-Pyrenees region).
For simplicity, we will now focus on the results obtained for Program 1. It is
important to mention here that 19 persons (over 33 total who agree to participate in
program I) agreed to participate in the program for zero compensation. This can be
seen in Fig. 2.4, which shows the distribution of the WTA bids.
It is also worth noting that 70 respondents indicated that they were not using the

banks of the river, among which 33 also indicated not keeping up that land. Comparing
now the minimum compensation demanded by those among them who also accepted to
participate in a preservation program (14 people), we observe a significantly lower
result. They demanded smaller compensations. One reason that may explain why they
do ask for compensation, however, comes from the fact that they are willing to widen
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the existing strip of land not being used. The amount of compensation demanded
would therefore account for this additional part they would be willing to allocate to the
preservation program.

Econometric Estimation
The LIMDEP software program was used to run the estimations (Greene, 1991).
The Probit model for distinguishing between those who did and those who did not
accept to participate in the preservation program (ACC) was initially estimated. The
regression results are presented in Table 2.3. They indicate that being a farmer (FAR),
not using the parcels up to the river's edge (lJSE), and the total size of the lot(s)
adjacent to the river (SUP) are the major factors determining whether a landowner
accepts to participate in the preservation program. We obtained significant !-statistics
for each of these variables (at 5 and 10%).

Table 2.3
Results of the Heckman 2-step procedure estimation
Variable

Estimated coefficient

t-statistic

Pro bit
.22

2.2

USE

.19

2.6

SUP

.02

1.8

2868

2.0

FAR

Two-stage least square
IN!
IN2

2962

2.1

PAR

288.4

2.3

-2406.0

-1.8

Lambda
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ACC = 0.22 FAR- 0.19 USE + 0.02 SUP.

Both the USE and the FAR variables were dichotomous variables, which took the
value of one if the lots were not being used up to the river's edge, and if respondents
were farmers, respectively.
The obtained variables, such as income, education level, number of dependents,
and type of activity on the lots cou ld not explain landowners' acceptance to participate.
The likelihood ratio index forthe Probit estimation was [1-(55.9/58.3)] = 0.043.
The second step, the least-squares estimation of the minimum compensation
demanded by respondents, corrected for heteroskedasticity, was then estimated. The
variab les income (IN! , IN2), and the number of parcels they own by the river (PAR)
are significant in determining the amount ofWTA demanded. Results are indicated in
Table 2.3.

WTA = 2868 INl

296211\2 ... 288.4 SUP

The variable !Nl included respondents with a net monthly income per household of less
than 2,000 USD (1 0,000 francs), while the variab le IN2 included respondents with a net
monthly income per household comprised between 2,000 USD and 3,600 USD (10,000
to 18,000 francs) . They are positively related to the amount of compensation
demanded. The PAR variable is also positively correlated with the amount of
compensation demanded. The R 2 obtained for the second step of the estimation was
.27.

1:
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The coefficient of lambda estimated in the Heckman procedure was significant at
95%. As explained in the next section, this indicates that there is no selection bias.

Reasons for Refusal to Participate
Thus far, we have concentrated our discussion on respondents who indicated that
they would accept offers to participate in a program. However, given the important
number of households who refused to participate in a program (55 households), it is at
least equally important to understand the reasons for their refusal to participate (only
two respondents refused to answer whether they were interested or not in a preservation
program).
Based on survey comments, we distinguished four main reasons for refusal to
participate.
I. Geographical: people refused to participate because their lot was too small,
there existed some buildings, or else the banks were too steep.
2. Personal: people indicated that they were too old, too busy, or else that they
wanted to sell their land.
3. Protest: people indicated that they opposed the programs themselves (i.e.,
would refuse hikers' access, etc.), the idea of being compensated, or because they do
not trust the government.
4. Other: for example, the respondents did not know exactly the location of their
lots.
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As can be seen from Table 2.4, the main reason for refusal invoked by
respondents is geographical (39.5%). One possible interpretation here is that
respondents did not feel "concerned" by the program, either because the compensation
would need to be umealistically high, for example, where buildings exist on the lot, or
else because the lot is so small that compensation would be insignificant. Given the
fact that farmers, on average, own larger lots by the river, it is consistent that they had a
low percentage of responses in this category (17%).
For farmers, the main reason for refusal was "protest" (34.5%). It may be
important to add that farmers represent a group that often suffers under environmental
programs to conserve water or control pollutants. As a result, they typically oppose
such programs. Moreover, they are often presented a wide variety of programs
(environmental or not). Similarly, recall that non-farmers are mainly represented by
retirees, 41% of whom are older than 65. This would explain why the "personal"
reason comes second for this latter category. They may, for example, feel too old to
participate in a I 0-year preservation program; thus, they may be unwilling to tie their
heirs to their decision.

Table 2.4
Reasons for refusal to participate in a preservation program, in percentage
Landowner

Protest

Personal

Geographical

Other

Total

Farmer

34.5 (8)

22.0 (5)

17.5 (4)

26.0 (6)

100 (23)

Non-farmer

17.5 (7)

27.5 (II)

52.5 (21)

2.5 (I)

100 (40)

Total
24.0 (15)
25.5 (16)
Number of persons responding in parentheses.

39.5 (25)

11.0 (7)

100 (63)
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It is also interesting to note that among respondents who indicated that they did
not maintain or use the banks, 19 still refused to participate in the program . In other
words, they refused to be compensated for a program they essentially are already in
compliance with.

Discussion

Parallel to this study, Desaigues and Gauthier (1997) conducted a survey
evaluating the benefits associated with the protection of tbe riverbanks. They used the
CVM to ask the general publi c in the region how much they would be willing to pay to
have a program of protection implemented. The proposed program was similar to
Program I of this study. It was also added that access to the riverbanks would then
most probably be restricted, if not forbidden to the general public. In other words, a
large portion of the value attributed to the program would be non-use value. The
average WTP they obtained is 30 USD (150 rrancs) per year, and for 5 years. The total
budget it represents is approximately 3 million USD (15 million francs) per year. On
the cost side, we estimated that the total cost of implementing such a program would
amount to 280,000 USD (1.4 millions francs) per year. In other words, costs were
smaller than benefits.

Conclusions

Tbis srudy was undertaken with the primary purpose of assessing the welfare loss
to landowners resulting rrom the implementation of a preservation program along the
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Garonne Ri ver. Several conclusions can be drawn . The analysis indicates that the
WT A format can be effectively used to estimate welfare loss. Moreover, the binary/
continuous model appears not to lead to exaggerated estimates, since WTA figures
elicited existing market values. This result is also confirmed by the rather large number
of zero bids obtained. However, it is important to add that the use of the WTA measure
has been possible for two main reasons : respondents had a thorough knowledge of the
good itself and its value to them--this is panicularly true for fanners--and the proposed
preservation program was realistic. Respondents believed in the applicability of the
program, which then does not represent a vague and improbable possibility.
One interesting question is to ask if, in the case where respondents do not know
the good very well, the divergence between WI A and WTP should be attributed not as
much to substitution and income effects, but rather to some "strategic" behavior. ln
other words, would respondents minimize their bid in a WTP format if they were
uncertain of its utility, while exaggerating their WTA value not having anything to
lose? It seems therefore very important in any welfare loss estimation to be able to link
the good, or th e event, to already known factors or situations. This topic will be studied
more in depth in our next paper, where we analyze the effect of a "contingent first-price
sealed-bid auction" on the WIA estimates.
Finally, this study sheds some light on the reasons why some respondents refused
to participate in the preservation program. We were able to differentiate those who
were indifferent to the program from those who opposed ii. This information provides
some important policy insights. For instance, many respondents admitted being
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interested in the program, but suggested some variations, or else preferred some other
means of compensation (for example, technical advice on how to maintain riparian
land). Similarly, protest responses may, in some cases, be of valuable interest in future
studies as they indicate that respondents' refusal to participate is not as much linked to
the good itselfbut to the "administration" part of it. This is particularly true for
respondents who emitted strong reservations toward the governmental agency or the
feasibility of the program itself. It would of valuable interest in any WTP study to be
able to differentiate these answers from other zero WTP bids.
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CHAPTER3
.AJ'PLICA TIO

OF

HYPOTHETICAL AUCTI01 SETTING

TO WILLINGNESS-TO-ACCEPT MEASURE IN A
CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY '

Abstract

This paper is devoted to examining funher the potential for undertaking valuation
exercises using the WT A format , by comparing WT A estimates obtained in an openquestion format with a 'contingent first-price sealed bid auction' setting. Results
indicate that WTA values obtained in the two different settings were not stati stically
different. We conclude that WTA estimates in the open question format were not
exaggerated. More generally, this paper shows that the use of auctions can be
successfully applied to the provision of public goods in the case of compensation
demanded.

Introduction

When using the contingent valuation method, researchers generally agree that the
use of the willingness-to-accept format often leads to one important bias: the lack of
upper bound in the minimum compensation demanded. Respondents tend to inflate
their minimum compensation demanded (Cummings et al., 1986). This conclusion has

'Coauthored by Catherine Broadhead and Basudeb Biswas.
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traditionally been reached by comparing willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-toaccept (WTA) measures. Several explanations have been suggested to explain this
difference, such as a psychological (Kahneman et al., 1990) and economic one
(Hanemann, 1991). As pointed out by Hanemann, there is no evidence that both
measures should, in theory, be equivalent.
This paper is devoted to examining further the potential for undertaking valuation
exercises using the WTA format, by comparing WTA estimates obtained in an openended question format with a "contingent first-price sealed bid auction" setting. A game
theory approach is used to analyze respondents' strategies, and the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium is defined.
We first explain the different types of auctions and the types of response they lead
to. We then analyze the first-price sealed bid auction as a direct application of game
theory. Finally, we apply the analysis to our survey (Chapter 2).
Results indicate that respondents' mean WT A measures are not statistically
different. This result is confirmed when a Heckman model regression (Broadhead,
1997), including whether or not respondents were placed in an auction setting, is run.
The auction setting did not lead respondents to indicate lower compensation values.
This result is consistent with the List and Shogren (1998) findings. In other words, the
estimates obtained with the simple open-ended question format reflected individuals'
true values.
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Auctions

The practice of auctioning takes us back to a very long time. Cassady (1967)
tracks it to 500 BC, in Babylon, for the sale of women to be married. The study of
auctions, however, is more recent. The origin of the subject is the seminal work by
Vickrey (1961) and later the important contributions by Griesmer et al. (1967), who
initiated formulations in terms of games with incomplete information, later specified as
Bayesian games (Harsanyi, 1967; Myerson, 1985; Gibbons, 1992).
In many markets, transaction prices are determined in auctions. It is the case, for
example, for the sale of timber, antique objects, farming products or animal stocks. In
the most common form, prospective buyers compete by submitting bids to a seller.
Each bid is an offer to buy, which states a quantity .and a maximum price. The seller
then allocates the available supply among those offering the highest prices exceeding
the seller's asking price (Wilson, 1992). Auctions can also exhibit one buyer and several
sellers, in which case only sellers offering a minimum price will be selected.
There exist a variety of auctions. We can classify them based on the relationship
between different buyers' valuations of what is being auctioned. Rasmussen (1989)
describes the difference between a private-value auction, a common-value auction, and
a correlated-value one. Following the author, we will call the dollar value of the utility
that player i receives from an object its value to her, vi, and we will call her estimate of
its value her valuation Vi.

In a private-value auction, each player knows the true value they attribute to the
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auctioned object, even though they may not know the values of the other players. Very
importantly, a player cannot extract any information about their own value from the
valuations of the other players. One example, mentioned above, is the sale of timber.
Knowing all the other bids would not change player i's value for the lot, although it
may change their strategy.
In contrast, a common-value auction is characterized by the fact that players have
identical values. In this case, private information plays a considerable role as the other
players' valuations affect player i's own value. The new issue of corporate bonds and
stocks in the US , which are usually sold to investment bankers, belongs to that category
of auctions. Each bidder is eager to know the others' valuations in order to form a more
accurate idea of the true value of the good.
However, the majority of auctions in everyday life is situated between the privatevalue auction and the common-value one. That is, we are dealing with what is called
the correlated-value auction, in which the valuations of the different bidders are
correlated but their values may differ. For modeling purposes, however, private-value
versus common-value auctions is an appropriate simplification. As we will soon see,
the case studied in this paper deals with private-value auction.
If it is true that all auctions have set rules, imply given strategies, and then define
payoffs, they often vary greatly. It is therefore interesting to classify auctions based on
the different rules they imply. Typically, the types of auctions often described are: (a)
English (ascending, first-price open), (b) first-price sealed bid, (c) second-price sealed
bid, and (d) Dutch (descending).
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English
The seller offers an item and they accept the highest bid offered above their
asking price. Each bidder is free to revise their bid upward. A player's strategy is their
seri es of bids as a functi on of their value, their prior estimate of other players'
valuations, and the past bids of all other players. Their bid can, therefore, be updated as
their information set changes. The winner's payoff is their value minus their highest bid.
The English auction is the most common type of auction in the United States. Cassady
(1967) estimated that 78% or more of all auctions in the world are conducted on the
ascend ing-bid basis.

First-Price Sealed Bid
Each bidder subnlits one bid, in ignorance of the other bids. The highest bidder
pays their bid and wins the object. A player's strategy is their bid as a function of their
value and their prior beliefs about the other players' valuations. The winner's payoff is
their value minus their bid.

Secon d-Price Sealed Bid
Each bidder submits one bid, in ignorance of the other bids. The bids are opened,
and the highest bidder pays the amount of the second-highest bid and wins the object. A
player's strategy is their bid as a function of their value and their prior beliefs about the
other players' valuations. The winner's payoff is their value nlinus the second-highest
bid that was made.
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Dutch
The seller announces a bid, which they continuously lower until some buyer stop s
them and takes the object at that price. One example is the Ontario tobacco auction,
cited in Rasmussen ( 1989), which uses a clock four feet in diameter marked with
quarter cent gradations. Each of six or so buyers has a stop button. The clock hand
drops a quarter cent a time, and the stop buttons are registered so that ties cannot occur.
The farmers who are selling their tobacco watch from an adjoining room and can later
reject the bids if they feel they are too low (reserve price). This type of auction is also
used for the sale of fish in England (Cassady, 1967). A player's strategy is when to stop
the bidding as a function of their valuation and their prior beliefs as to other players'
valuations. The winner's payoff is their value minus their bid.
Those different types of auctions tend to be associated with particular kinds of
commodities. The sale of fish and the sale of real estate, for example, require different
auctioning methods. Oral auctions, either English or Dutch, are favored for animal
stock and perishable commodities, perhaps to ensure rapid consideration of many lots
with variable quality attributes. Most auctions of art and antiques use the oral format
also . On the other hand, in the United States, new issues of corporate bonds and stocks
are usually sold via sealed bids, as is the sale of timber in France (Elyakime eta!. ,
1994) as well as in the United States. Land and buildings are also often so ld via sealed
bids.
Each type of auction encourages a very specific type of response. In other words,
these auctions lead to different strategies from bidders. For both the English and the
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second-price sealed bid auctions, the player's dominant strategy is to keep bidding some
small amount epsilon more than the previous high bid until they reach their valuation
and then stop. This is optimal because they always want to buy the object if the price is
less than its value to them, but they want to pay the lowest price possible. In the case of
the second-price sealed bid auction, one's valuation is the dominant strategy since the
players who bid less are more likely to lose the auction, but pay the same price if they
do win. All bidding ends when the price reaches the valuation of the player with the
second-highest valuation. The optimal strategy is independent of risk neutrality if
players know their own values with certainty rather than estimating them, although
risk-averse players who must estimate their values should be more conservative in
bidding.
The Dutch and the first-price sealed bid auctions are strategically equivalent. The
trade-off is between bidding high--thus winning more often--and bidding low--thus
benefitting more if the bid wins. The optimal strategy depends on the players' risk
preference and their belief about the other players. The equilibrium is therefore less
robust than the equilibrium of English and second-price sealed bid auctions. The reason
for the equivalence between the two types of auctions is that in both cases, the only
disclosed information is the last bid. In the first-price sealed bid auction, a player's bid
is irrelevant unless it is the highest. Similarly, in the Dutch auction, a player's stopping
price is not disclosed unless it is the highest.
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Finally, an analysis of auctions can consider whether the process is static or
dynamic. In dynamic versions, the bidders observe others' bids and they can revise their
bids sequentially.
For the purpose of this paper, we wi ll focus on the first-price sealed bid auction,
in the frame of a private- (or independent-) value auction. Moreover it will be a static
process.

Auctions As a Direct Application of Game Theory

Because auctions are stylized markets with well-defined rules, auctions are apt
subjects for applications of game theory (Ph lips, 1988). Moreover, they represent some
interesting cases of strategic behavior. They also are useful to elicit preferences so that
maximal gains from trade can be realized .
They are particularly valuable as illustrations of games of incomplete information
because bidders' private information is the main factor affecting strategic behavior. The
simpler forms of auctions induce normal-form games that are essentially "solved" by
applying directly the basic equilibrium concepts of non-cooperative game theory, such
as the Nash equilibrium (Wi lson, 1992).
We will concentrate here on the first-price sealed bid auction and the game form it
takes. The first-price sealed bid auction represents a game of incomp lete information
also called Bayesian game.
In a game of incomplete information, the players' payoff functions are not
common knowledge. There exists at least one player who is not sure about the other
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players' payoffs functions . For the auction of interest in this paper, each bidder knows
her own valuation for the good being sold, but does not know the other bidders'
valuation. Since bids are submitted in sealed-envelopes, we can think of the players'
moves as being simultaneous.
Harsanyi (1967) made the assumption that, in dealing with games of incomplete
information, every player assigns a subjective probability to all variables not depending
on the player's own strategy choice. Consequently, the situation can be redefined as a
game of complete information on the probability functions from which each bidder
draws her valuation and on everybody's payoff or utility (Gibbons, 1992).
We follow here Gibbons' representation of the normal form of a static Bayesian
game. The normal-form representation of ann-player game of complete information is

G = {S , ... S,; u, ...u,}

(Ia)

where Si is player i's strategy space and U; (s, , . . ., s") is player i's payoff when the
players choose the actions (s 1, ••• , s,). This can also be written as

G = {A,, ... A,; u 1,

••• u,}

(!b)

where Ai is player i's action space and U; (a, ... , aJ is player i's payoff when the players
choose the actions (a,, .. ., aJ. In effect in a simultaneous-move game of complete
information a strategy for a player is simply an action. In the case of a game of
incomplete information, we first need to represent the idea that if each player knows their
own payoff function, they are uncertain about the other players' function s. Let player i's
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possible payoff functions be represented by u, (a, ... , a,; tJ, where t represents the type of
player i, and belongs to a type space T,. For example, if player i has two payoff functions,
they are said to have two types, ~ 1 and ~ 2 . Their payoff functions would be noted

(2)

Writing that player i knows their payoff function is the same as saying that they know
their type(s). Similarly, we can write that player i is uncertain about the other players
types, denoted

t_,

t.;·

= (tJ' ...., t;. J> ~+J··· · · t,)

(3)

We denote the probability distribution representing the player i's belief about the other
players' types, !_; , P; (t_; It,).
It is important here to note that we are in a private-value type of auction. ln other
words, players' types are independent. p; (t., /t,) does not depend on t,. Therefore, we can
write player i's belief as p; (t.;).
To define an equilibrium concept for this static Bayesian game, we first need to
define the players' strategy spaces in the game. The central idea is that each player's
strategy must be a best response to the other players' strategies. Therefore, a Nash
equilibrium is simply a

ash equilibrium in a Bayesian game.

ln the static Bayesian game, G = {A I> ...... A,, T 1•••• ••Tn; p 1 •. • Pn; u 1,

.......

Un}, the

strategies s*= (s* 1 ••• s* J are a (pure strategy) Bayesian . rash equilibrium if for each
player i and for each ofi's types in T;, s*,

(~)solves
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m ax 2: U,{s,*(t 1), . .

,s* , _ 1 ) , a, ,s*,~ 1 (t; . 1 ), .. ,s,*(t,);t]p,(t

(4)

_,I t;)

a,e A t,e r _,

That is, no player wants to change his or her strategy, even if the change involves only
one action by one type.
Having explained a Bayesian game, we now turn to the representation of the firstprice sealed bid auction. W e assume there are n bidders (i

=

! ,... , n). Bidder i is said to

have a valuation vi for the commodity sold. If i gets the good and pays the price p, then
i's payoff is v,-p.
It is necessary at this point to make some assumptions. Although each bidder does
not know their rivals' bid functions , they can make informed guesses by supposing that
the valuations of all bidders are drawn from the same probability distribution (Phlips,
1988). Following Vickrey ( 196 1), this distribution is assumed to be rectangular, so that
each value is equally likely. The bidders' valuations are uniforml y distributed on the
same interval [0, I] by a suitable choice of scale and origin. Finally, the bidders'
valuations are independent. In other words, a bidder's valuation conveys no information
about the other bidders' valuations. To go back to our previous notation, this last
assumption was written as p, (t_, /t1)

= p1 (t.;).

Bids are constrained to be non-negative. The bidders submit their bids
simultaneously. The higher bidder wins the good and pays the price they bid; the other
bidders pay and get nothing. In case of a tie, the winner is determined by the flip of a
coin. We assume that all bidders have the same risk preferences, in order to concentrate
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attention on the incomplete information aspect. In this case, and following Vickrey
( 1961 ), we assume that bidders are risk neutral. This is reflected by the linear form
taken by their utility fimction (or payoff) . Finally, all of the above information is
common knowledge.
The action is the submitting of a (non-negative) bid, b 1• The valuation of player i
(or her type) is denoted vi, following the previous example.

(5)

The action space,

A;= [0, oo]

(6)

The type space,

~ =

[0, I]

(7)

Because valuations are independent, player i believes that vi is uniformly distributed on
[0, 1], no matter what the value of v1• Player i's payoff function is:

I

vi-bi if b , > b J]
u,(b ,, ... b,;v,, ... v,)= (vi- bi) / n ifb , = b ,

To derive a Bayesian

0

ifb , < b ,

(8)

ash equilibrium of this auction, we begin by constructing

the players' strategy space. In a Bayesian game, a strategy space is a function from the
type and action spaces. Therefore, a strategy for player i is a fimction b,(v;) specifying
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the bid that each ofi's types or valuations would choose. Player i's b,(v,) is a best
response to the other players' strategies b1(v;) and vice versa.
Formally, the pair of strategies (b(v 1) , b(v,)) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for
each v1 in [0,1], b,(v;) solves

(9)

Each player tries to maximize the mathematical expectation of their own payoff in
terms of their probability distribution pi. This assumption is called the Bayesian
hypothesis. Each player i maximizes the expected payoff of the winning bid, that is the
difference between their valuation

Y; and

the winning bid b,, since their utility is simply

(v;- b,) they win, and 0 otheiWise, multiplied by the probability of making the hi ghest
bid. With a common rectangular distribution and independence, this probability is nb,"-1
('). Each player thus maximizes

H, = (v; - b;) nb;"" 1

(10)

Taking the first derivative with respect to b;, and setting it equal to O,we have

(11)

This gives us

2
With a rectangular distribution F(v) = v for vE[O, 1], the probability that the first n-1
players draw a value below b is b""1• This has to be multiplied by n, to allow for the
possibi lity that any of then players might have the top values (Phlips, 1988)
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(v1-b,) (n-l )- b; = 0
b 1 + ll(n-1) b 1 = v1

( 12)

or

b*1 = (n- lln) v 1

(i= l, ... ,n)

This solution is the unique Nash equilibrium strategy to be played by each player.
The person wi th the highest valuation makes the highest bid and is thus the winner.
Therefore, given the assumptions previously made, the first-price sealed bid auction
leads to pareto optimal results. B ecause of the independence of bidders' valuations, we
can see here that i's bid does not depend on other players' valuations vi . Let us also
notice here that as n increases, the equilibrium bids get closer to reservation values. If,
for example, b 1 = 0.5, and n = 2, then nb"-1= 1. Ifn = 3, then the probability of winning
the bid becomes 0. 75 (Phlips, 1988).

Past Work

The contingent valuati on method (CVM) is an empirical technique often used to
measure environmental benefits due to a change in a non-market good or environmental
quality. This method has become one of the most widely used non-market valuation
techniques over the past years. Its predominance is due to its flexibility and ability to
estimate total value, including non-use value.
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When using CVM, researchers generally agree that the use of the WTA format
often leads to one important bias--the lack of upper bound in the minimum
compensation demanded. Respondents tend to inflate their minimum compensation
demanded (Cummings eta!., 1986). The disparity between WTA and WTP measures
has been extensively documented and several explanations have been suggested. It is
sometimes attributed to certain psychological factors. For example, Boyce eta!. (1992)
explain it using the concept of intrinsic values. Individuals may want to preserve an
environmental amenity for moral (or other) reasons. These values would appear more
easily in WTA estimates than in WTP measures.
Kahneman eta!. (1990) based their argument on an endowment or the "loss
aversion" effect. The endowment effect states that an individual attributes a subjective
value to gains and losses--winning 50 USD does not have the same value as losing 50
SD. This effect exists when an individual becomes attached to the good because he or
she is often rewarded for doing so in many contexts (Shogren eta!., 1994). This
attachment leads the respondent to overestimate her minimum WT A compared to her
WTP. Shogren eta!. (1994) tested and rejected the hypothesis of an existing
endowment effect. Rather, their res u Its seem to support the economic explanation of
difference between WTA and WTP, provided by Hanemann (1991), who explained the
divergence between the two measures in terms of substitution and income effects. The
greater the income effect, and/or the smaller the substitution effect, the greater the
disparity between WTP and WT A measures. As substitutability decreases, the trade-off
between two goods x and y becomes less desirable, implying a greater disparity
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between the two estimates. Cummings et a!. (1986) document six cases in which survey
values for commodities ranging from hunting permits to cleaner air show disparities
from about three to one up to ten to one in the ratio ofWTA to WTP.
This well-documented difference between the two measures has had the direct
effect of trying to avoid, whenever possib le, the use of the WTA estimate, especially in
the case of public goods.
Theory suggests that one way of forcing down WT A estimates is to put
respondents in an auction setting. Few studies have been conducted to test for the
difference in WTA values obtained in an auction setting compared with another setting,
such as open-ended or dichotomous formats. Kumeuther et al. (1987) tested the use of a
low bid auction in the case of the noxious facility location process, where the host
community indicating the lowest bid obtains the facility and receives its bid as
compensation. This compensation is financed by the other communities. Their findings
show that the sealed bid auction dissuades communities from greatly exaggerating their
compensation requirements.
Coursey et al. (1987) explored the divergence in WT A values between two
frames--the hypothetical WT A setting and the Vickrey, or second-pri ce sealed bid
auction setting. The commodity chosen for their experiment was a bitter-unpleasant
taste experience, that of sucrose octa-acetate. Their result suggest that hypothetical
measure of value obtained using WTA are likely to be biased upwards from values
obtained from a market-like auction (Coursey eta!., 1987). Bishop and Heberlein
(1986) found that deer hunters understated their actual WTA to sell deer-permits in a
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sealed bid auction setting, while hunters faced with simple dichotomous choice frame
overstated their real WT A.
List and Shogren (1998) analyzed the effect of the use of an auction setting in the
context of the selling price for Christmas gifts. Their results indicate that framing of the
WTA estimates did not matter. Mean WTA estimates obtained with the hypothetical
open-ended survey were not statistically different from estimates obtained form the
hypothetical auction. Moreover, their findings suggest that respondents understated real
WTA, whether in the hypothetical open-ended format or in the hypothetical auction
setting.

Application to the Preservation Program of Humid
Zones on the Garonne River

Description of the Situation
We used the Contingent Valuation Survey conducted in the south of France in
spring 1997 to estimate the cost of preserving humid zones along the Garonne River
(Broadhead, 1997). Landowners were asked the minimum compensation they would
have to receive in order for them to stop farming along the river. The population
surveyed was 96 people, among whom were 39 farmers and 57 non-farmers. Half of
the population sampled was placed in a "contingent auction" market. In order for the
researcher to encourage participants to give their true minimum willingness to accept,
owners were told that only the "bidders" with the lowest value would be considered.
The survey was conducted by mail, and, for practical reasons, was a sealed bid auction.
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Moreover, it was a first-price sealed bid auction, as owners would receive their own bid
(or compensation demanded) if they were se lected. In the K.leindorfer and Sertel
(1994) analysis of the auctioning of an indivisible public good, one agent of a
community had to provide a public good, subject to compensation from the other
agents. For each agent, the provision cost of the public good varied. This was also the
case in the Kunreuther et a!. ( 1987) study of noxious facility siting. However, in this
study, and like a "real world auction," it is the buyer who compensates the selected
sellers. It is, to my knowledge, the first time such an experiment has been conducted.
We now turn to the analysis of this game.

Analysis

The model used earlier in this paper can be used here. We must, however, redefine
a number of aspects of the analysis. For example, the model of fust-price, sealed bid
auction described previously deali with one seller and many buyers. In our case, we
have one buyer, represented by the government, and many sellers, or more precisely the
owners of the lots. Only owners with the smallest bids were selected. Fig. 3.1 shows a
samp le of the questionnaire given to participants.
The compensation is paid by the French government. The use of the auction is
very important since it helps the buyer to obtain more accurate information on the
respondents' true wi llingness to accept values. As we have seen before, the use of the
auction encourages respondents to give their lowest compensation possible. More
formally, we are trying to get as close as possible to the equality v, = b,.
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A thorough study of the natural environm elll of the riverbanks has been
conducted by biologists and ecologists. This study shows that converting
only a part of the land along the Garonne River would suffice to restore
an acceptable level ofbiodiversity and to protect the nawral en vironment.
More precisely, it seems that restoring about 50% of the lots along the
River would be enough.
Th e effective compensation will be determin ed according to a threshold
(chosen by considering th e different costs indicated by all the owners
con cerned). We will g ive priority to the individuals asking f or the
minimum compensations, until we obtain those 50% of th e lots, in the
limit of the allocated budget.
Fig. 3.1 . Sample questionnaire given to participants.

Following the previous notations, the payoff function for individual i is H;(L)=
b, - v,, where L represents the land considered
In other words, the profit of player i is the compensation b, he/she receives in
exchange for not farming on the land (for example, v, representing the value of the
production of corn on the lot) .
Defining b,* as the lowest bid, then each player is confronted with three possible
payoffs:
Ifb, < b;*, then player i receives b, - v,
If b, > b;*, then player i receives 0
The expected payoff for player i is

EH, = (b; - vJ prob (b, < bJ>

j • i)

EH, = (b,- v;) n b,"· '

Taking the ftrst derivative with respect to b;, we obtain

(13a)
(13b)
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(b,- v,) (n-1) n bt'+ n bt' = 0

(14)

Rearranging, we have

(v; - b;) (1-n) n bt'- n bt' = 0

(!Sa)

(v; - b,) (1-n) - b; =0

(15b)

v, (1-n) + b, (n-2)

=

0

(15c)

The equilibrium strategy is for player i to bid

b*; = (n-1)

V;

/(n-2)

(i= l , .. .,n)

( ! 6)

Equilibrium bids get closer to reservation prices, or valuations, as n increases. Tn other
words, when placed in a first-price sealed bid auction, respondents are encouraged to
announce a compensation closer to their true WTA val ue as the number of panicipants
increases.

Results
The average WTA value for owners who were in a competitive setting is lower
than the average WTA value for owners not placed in a competitive setting. Results are
descri bed in Table 3.1.
On average, farmers who were told only the lowest compensations would be
considered indicated lower values. For farmers, the average compensation demanded
amounted to about 500 USD, while the average compensation obtained with the other
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half of the farmers' group was about 610 USD. Therefore, there was a difference of
about 100 USD. For non-farmers, the difference amounted to 40 USD - 17 USD for
those in the "auction setting," 57 USD for the others. However, these differences within
each group (farmers and non-farmers, respectively) are not statistically significantly
different at a = 0.1 0.
We used the Heckman model and ran a regression using the binary variable
"com," which stood for whether or not respondents were placed in the "auction selling."

ACC = 0.27 FAR + 0.27 USE - 0.04 COM
WTA = 2403.7 IN! + 2702.4 IN2 + 363 .7 PAR

where ACC represents whether or not respondents accept to participate in the
preservation program, FAR represents whether or not respondents are farmers, USE
represents the total size of the parcels owned by the river, COM represents whether or
not respondents were placed in the auction setting, WTA represents the respondents'
minimum compensation demanded, IN!, and IN2 represents income, and PAR
represents the number of parcels owned by respondents.

Table 3.1
Average WTA demanded by respondents
WTA in compennve sening

WT A with open-ended format

Fanners

610 (USD)

500 (USD)

. on-farmers

57 (USD)

17 (USD)

Respondent
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Table 3.2 shows the t-stats for the variable COM were not significant. Knowing
that they participate in an auction did not mfluence respondents' answers as to whether
or not they wanted to participate in the preservation program of the riverbanks.
We then tested if the COM variable was significant in the second step, the least
square regression of the Heckman model. Table 3.3 summarizes the findings.
The t-stats for the variable COM were not significant. ln other words, the amount
of compensation demanded by respondents was not affected by whether or not they
were placed in an auction setting. It is consistent with our earlier findings, which
indicate the absence of significant difference between mean WTA estimates when
respondents are faced with the auction setting and those answering open-ended
question.
These results would indicate that lando,vners gave their "true" WT A values when
placed in the open-ended question fonnat. This conclusion is consistent with List and

Tab le 3.2
Results of the Heckman 2-step procedure estimation for the
COM variable
Heckman 2-step

Estimated coefficient

t ~s tatistic

Pro bit
FAR
USE
COM
Two-stage least square
IN!
!N2

PAR

.27
.2 7
-.04

2403.7
2702.4
363 .7

2.8
2.7
-.4

2.1
2.2
3.0
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Tab le 3.3
Results of the Heckman 2-step procedure estimation
using COM as a variable
Heckman 2-step

Probit
FAR
USE
Two-stage least square
IN!
IN2

COM

PAR

Estimated coefficient

t-statistic

.4
·.7

1.3
·2.9

2403.7
2702.4
·582.2
3 18.3

2. 1
2.2
·.4
2.1

Shogren's (1998) findings. The framing of the question did not seem to affect
individuals' behavior. In other words, CVM can be successfully used using the openquestion format in the case of compensation demanded.

Conclusions

The majority of CVM studies involving WTA estimation indicate that individuals
have a tendency to overestimate their minimum compensation. This conclusion has
traditionally been reached when comparing WTA and WTP measures. Several
explanations have been suggested, such as a psychological (loss aversion effect) and
economic (substitution and income effects). As pointed out by Hanemann (1991), there
is no evidence that both measures should, in theory, be equivalent.
This paper tested for the accuracy of the respondents' WT A values by comparing
WT A estimates in two distinct settings. In the first setting, respondents were asked to
state their minimum compensation demanded using an open question fonnat , while in
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the second setting, individuals were informed that only those indicating the lowest
compensation would be selected to participate in the preservation program (auction
setting).
This hypothetical auction mechanism is interesting in that it discourages
respondents with high values to participate in the preservation program. In other words,
the auction setting leads to a self-selection of the respondents. Moreover, theory
predicts that the first-price sealed bid auction setting does lead respondents to ask for
compensations closer to their true value. Moreover, it indicates that the greater the
number of participants, the closer to their true value the compensation demanded will
be.
Results indicate that even though lower average compensations were obtained for
both groups (farmers and non-farmers), we fail to reject the hypothesis that revealed
values in the two different settings are derived from the same parental population. This
result is confirmed by the non-significance of the variable "competition" in both the
first and the second-step of the Heckman procedure. The auction setting did not lead
respondents to indicate lower compensation values, nor did it discourage respondents to
participate in the preservation program .
These results lead to the conclusion that respondents gave their true WT A value in
the open format and did not overestimate the compensation demanded. We must,
however, reiterate that throughout the pages, we have made some rather strong
assumptions, in panticular symmetries among bidders, common knowledge of the
probability distributions, and absence of risk aversion.
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More generally, this paper shows tha the use of auctions can be successfully
applied to the provision of public goods. This finding is important in that it allows
researchers to use the WT A measure whenever this format is the only one that can be
app li ed for property rights issues or political reasons.
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CHAPTER4
CONCLUSIONS

This study was undertaken with the primary purpose being to assess the welfare
loss to landowners from the implementation of a preservation program along the
Garonne River.
The analysis indicates that the WT A format can be used to estimate welfare loss.
Moreover, the Heckman binary/continuous model appears not to lead to exaggerated
estimates, since WTA figures elicited existing market values. This result is also
confirmed by the rather large number of zero bids obtained. It is important, however, to
add that respondents had a thorough knowledge of the good itself and its value to them
-- this is particularly true for farmers--and the proposed preservation program was
realistic. Respondents believed in the applicability of the program, which then does not
represent a vague and improbable possibility.
Finally, this study sheds some light on the reasons why some respondents refused
to participate in the preservation program. We were able to differentiate those who were
indifferent to the program from those opposed it. This information provides some
important policy insights. For instance, many respondents admitted being interested in
the program, but suggested some variations, or else preferred some other means of
compensation (for example, technical advice on how to maintain riparian land).
Similarly, protest responses may, in some cases, be of valuable interest in future studies
as they indicate that respondents' refusal to participate is not as much linked to the good
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itself but to the "administration" part of it. This is particularly true fo r respondents who
emitted strong reservations toward the governmental agency or the feasibility of the
program itself. It wou ld be of valuable interest in any WTP study to be able to
differentiate these answers from other zero WTP bids.
Another important aim to this study was to test for the accuracy of the
respondents' WT A values by using an hypothetical auction setting. We tested for the
accuracy of the respondents' WT A values by comparing WTA estimates in two distinct
settings. In the first setting, respondents were asked to state their minimum
compensation demanded using an open question format, while in the second setting,
individuals were informed that only those indi cating the lowest compensation wou ld be
selected to participate in the preservation program (auction setting).
This hypothetical auction mechanism is interesting in that it discourages
respondents with high values to participate in the preservation program. in other words,
the auction setting leads to a self-selection of the respondents. Theory predicts that the
first-price, sealed bid auction setting does lead respondents to ask for compensations
closer to their true value. Moreover, it indi cates that the greater the number of
parti cipants, the closer to their true value the compensation demanded will be.
Resu lts indicate that even though we obtained lower average compensations, for
both groups considered (farmers and non-farmers), we fail to reject the hypothesis that
revealed values in the two different settings are derived from the same parental
population. This result is confirmed by the non-significance of the variable
"competition" in both the first and the second step ofthe Heckman procedure. The
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auction setting did not lead respondents to ind icate lower compensation values, nor did
it discourage respondents to participate in the preservation program.
These results confirm the conclusions we had reached in our first paper. We can
conclude that respondents gave their true WT A value in the open fonnat and did not
overesti mate the compensation demanded.
More generally, it shows that the use of auctions can be successfully applied to
the provision of public goods. This finding is important in that it allows researchers to
use the WTA measure whenever this format is the only one that can be applied for
property rights issues or political reasons.
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Appendix B:
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RESTORATION OF THE RlP A.RlAN FOREST ALO G THE GARONNE
RIVER BETWEE

PORTET AND Mi\LAUSE

(CONTINGENT EVALUATION)

by B&B Consulting
March 1997

Quesiionnaire for non-jam1ers.

Precise date of the survey: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __
Place where the survey was conducted: - - - -- -- - - -- - - - - - - Place of the lots you own along the Garonne River:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (County)
The riparian forests along the Garonne River plays an important role in
V'
V'
V'
V'

stabili zing the banks
decreasing ground erosion
decreasing water polluti on
the reproduction and migration of the different species, such as the salmon, the
heron ..

If we want that different animal and vegetal species prosper in their natural environment,
we must recreate a natural habitat favorable to their development. It would therefore be
of interest to convert a strip of land of sufficient size to that effect.
We can preserve sites by creating natural reserves, by limiting their access to the public on
some sites, or by creating more or Jess accessible wooded areas.
The Ministry of the Environment conducted a survey on the benefits associated with
maintaining natural habitat along the Garorme River, between Porte! and Moissac. This
study allowed us to predict an estimated budget for the preservation program of the habitat
for ten years.
We are now trying to define some "maintenance contracts" in which you would voluntarily
undertake to respect some practices on the riverbanks, in exchange for a financial
compensation. This is precisely on the financial modalities of these contracts that we are
presently asking for your help.
The information that you can give us is very important in that it will help us choose a
particular preservation program.
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First, we would like to knowbener your current use of the lots you own on the ri verbanks.
Please cross the right answer(s) when necessary.
I. How many hectares of land do you own in total?_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __
2. How many lots do you own by the ri ver?_ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
3. What is the total area of these lots? - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - hectares
4. What is the linear of these lots?_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ ____ meters
5. Are those lots adjacent? Yes/no
6. Describe the general appearance of the ri verbanks on these lots:
banks small
slope small
high
steep
7. How do you use these lots?
Habitat/lending for farming/woods (which ones)/nothing/others
8. Do you currently use these lots up to the water level? Yes/no, why
9. (You don ' t use these lots up to the water level. ) Do you upkeep this strip of land
unused?
I 0. (You don ' t use these lots up to the water level.) What is the width of this strip ofland?

We are interested in a strip of land that could be from I 0 to 50 meters large on the
riverbanks. Different programs of preservation are possible. Each one of these programs
supposes different levels of participation from you, and therefore, different compensations.
The duration of these programs extends over a period of l 0 years, renewable. The
government, the owner and the eventual farmer commit themselves by written. The
contract signed is attached to the land. In other words, even if the lot is sold, the next
owner has to respect the contract. In the case where the lot is rented for farming, a contract
is signed between the owner and the farmer. [ ... ]
If, at the end of this period, you wish to convert back that strip ofland to its previous use,
the costs associated to the conversion (investment in time and material) is taken care by
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the government or its representative. If you are satisfied with the program and wish, at the
end of 10 years, to keep it, a new contract is then signed. ( ... ]
We are now going to present to you three programs. We are asking you what would be the
minimum compensation that you should receive for you to accept to participate to those
programs. These programs would not question the existing rights of irrigation, and
pumping.

MONETARY COMPENSATION
We envisage the payment of a compensation per hectare, conditional on the choice of a
program.
Program 1: No upkeep

You provide the land. The strip of land allocated to the program is not to be kept up . Its
width is between I 0 and 50 meters. This protected zone would allow for preservation and
reproduction of different species.
Program 2: Upkeep of a trail

You provide the land. You maintain a 3 meters wide traiL This trail may be used by
hunters, fishermen, or hikers. The upkeep of the trail is your responsibility. The width of
this strip of land is between I 0 and 50 meters.
Program 3: Upkeep+ wood

You provide the land. You maintain a 3 meters wide trail at your charge. You plant the
trees and bushes which are supplied to you and you are responsible for the upkeep of the
land twice a year. The upkeep consists of clearing brushwood, getting rid of dead wood
and garbage. The heavy upkeep work (e.g. cutting trees) is also your responsibility, but
the wood belongs to you.
11 . To which one of this program(s) would you accept to participate?
Program I
program 2
program 3
none

82
12. (You accept to participate to several programs.) Which program do you prefer?
Program 1
program 2
program 3
13. (You accept to participate to a program.) What would be the strip of land width you
would accept to allocate to this program?
meters
14. What is the minimum compensation that you would have to receive to participate in
this program? _ __ francs
15. (You refuse to participate to a program.) Can you briefly indicate the reasons of your
refusal? _____________________________
16. Is the duration of the program inconvenient to you?

Yes/no

17. If yes, what would be a more convenient duration of the program for you?_____

18. (You refuse to participate in a program.) Let's suppose that the owners of the lots
adjacent to your(s) accept to participate in one of these programs. Will their decision
have an impact on your activity on your lot(s)? Yes/no
19. (You refuse to participate in a program.) Let 's suppose that the owners of the lots
adjacent to your(s) accept to participate in one of these programs. Would their
decision affect your choice? Yes/no
IfYes,why? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____
To conclude this survey, we are now going to ask you some personal questions. Th ese
questions are important because they allow us to improve the quality ofthe analysis. Your
answers will stay confidential and anonymous. They will be used to the sole purpose of
data treatment.
20. Have you already participated in agri-environmental programs? Yes/no
If yes, which ones?_________________________
21. Do you contribute to an association? Yes (environmental; humanitarian; hunting,
fishing; others )/no
22. Do you sometimes undertake actions to clean the river or upkeep its banks? Yes/no

83
23 . Do you own some land along some other riverbanks? Yes/no
24. Gender: female/male
25. Year of birth:_ _ __
26. Current family situation: married, cohabitation; single; divorced; widow
27. Schooling: before high-school/high-school/ high-school + 2or +3; above
28.

umber of persons living with you (including you): - - -- - - - - - - - -

29.

umberofcmlmen: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ________________

30.

umber of dependents: -----------------------------------------

3 1. Occupation: senior executive/ middle manager/ factory worker/ employee! retired/
other
32. Total net monthly income of the household.
less than I IOOOF
I I 000-18000
more than !8000-40000F
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Appendix C:
CVM Studies
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Tab le C. I
Some of the CVM studies listed by Mitchell and Carson (1989)
Sample SIZe
(usable sample

conducted

Research
proced ure used

in parentheses)

WTPor
WTA

1985

ML, TLP, PI

201 (55)

WTP

1977, 1978

PI

108

WTP,
WTA

1982

PI

74, 84

WTP

Development rights

PI

22

WTA

Water quality

PI

20

WTP,
WTA

1974

PI

72

WTP

1981

PI

85

IVTP

PI

85

WTP

1984

ML

300,300
( 193, 200)

WTP,
WTA

1975

ML

30

WTP,
WTA

1973, 1974

TLP

200

IVTP

1982

ML , PI , TLP

144

IVTP

Year survey

Study

Good being valued

Anderson and Devereaux

Artificial fi shing

(1986)

reef

Brokshire and Randall
(1980)

Elk hunting

Burnes et al . (1983)

Disposal of tox1c
wastes

Conrad and Leblanc
(1979)
D'Arge (19 5)

Dtckie et al. ( 1979)

Price comparison
information for
supermarkets

FoSter et al. ( 1982)

Agricultural land

Ha lStead ( 1984)

Non-market values
of agnculturalland

Johnson et al. ( 1986)

Whue water
recreation

Jones-Lee ( 1976)

Value of life

Oster ( 1977)

Freshwater

pollution
Roberts et al. ( 1985)

Offshore d1V1ng
platforms

ML = Mail
TLP • Telephone

PI ... Personal interview
WTA = Willingness to accept

WTP ... Willingness to pay
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allocation project. Translated documents and interpreted seminars to French speaking
Senegalese, Malian and Mauritanian administrators, 1993-1997.
French instructor, DepartmentofLanguagesandPhilosophy, Utah State University. Taught
beginning, intermediate, advanced, and special topic French courses. Supervised students
in summer program in south of France. Course evaluations above Department and college
mean. 1992-1996.

P BLICA TIONS
Catherine Boulatoff Broadhead and Basudeb Biswas, "Game Theory Approach to
Contingent Valuation: First-price sealed bid Auction setting for Willingness to Accept
Measure," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, in preparation.
Catherine Boulatoff Broadhead and John Keith, "Riparian Zone Protection: the Use of the
Willingness to Accept Format in A Contingent Valuation Study, " Ecological Economics,
currently being revised.
Catherine BoulatoffBroadhead, John Keith, Jean-Pierre Amigues, and Brigitte Desaigues,
"More on the Divergence Between Willingness To Pay and Willingness to Accept in
Contingent Valuation Method," World Congress of Environmental and Resource
Economists in Venice, Italy, June 1998
Catherine Boulatoff Broadhead, Jean-Pierre Amigues, and Brigitte Desaigues, "Les
proprietaires riverains des bords de Garonne entre Porte! sur Garonne et Moissac,"
("Garonne Riverfront Landowners Between Porter sur Garonne and Moissac") Report
submitted to the French Ministry of the Environment, January 1997.

PRESENTATIONS
Linda Goetze, Vonda K. Jump, Dan Judd, Catherine Boulatoff-Broadhead, "Do IFSP
services Reflect the needs of the family or fundi ng eligibility and constraints?" International
Conference on Infant Studies, Brighton, England, July 2000.
Catherine Boulatoff Broadhead, John Keith, "Riparian Zone Protection: The Use of the
Willingness to Accept Format in A Contingent Valuation Study," Fifth Occasional
California Workshop on Environmental and Resource Economics, Santa Barbara, California,
May2000.
Linda Goetze, Catherine Boulatoff Broadhead, Vonda Jump, Dan Judd, "Evaluation of the
Ohio Early Intervention System," Poster presentation at the Conference on Research
Innovations in Early Intervention (CR!El 2000), San Diego, California, April 2000.

88
Linda Goetze, Catherine BoulatoffBroadhead, Vonda Jump, Dan Judd, "Evaluation ofOhio
Early Intervention Systems (EI)," Poster presentation at the Early Intervention Research
Institute (E!Rl 2000), Logan, Utah, February 2000.
Catherine BoulatoffBroadhead, John Keith, Jean-Pierre Amigues, and Brigitte Desaigues,
"More on the Divergence Between Willingness To Pay and Willingness to Accept in
Contingent Valuation Method," World Congress of Environmental and Resource
Economists in Venice, Italy, June 1998.

GRA.''iTS AND AWARDS
Co-principal investigator, "Bridges in the Lives of Youth with Disabilities: Community
Adjustment and Transition Outcomes." US Department for Education Office ofEducational
Research and Improvement, submitted February 2000.
Co-principal investigator, "Bridges in the Lives of Youth with Disabilities: Community
Adjustment and Transition Outcomes." Office of Special Education and Rehabilitation
services, submitted December I 999 .
French Department of the Environment Grant in conjunction with fNRA, "Contingent
Valuation Survey of French farmers," 1996-1997.
USU Women and Gender Research Institute, Graduate Student Research Award, 1996.

ASSOCIATIONS & ACTIVITIES

President, and Vice-President, Economic Graduate Student Association, USU 1993- 1995.
Member of American Agricultural Economic Association (AAEA).
Member of Western Agricultural Economic Association (W AEA).

FOREIGN LANGUAGES
French (native), English (fluent), German (basic)

PERSONAL
Born May 8, 1968
French citizen, US permanent resident

